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PAUL JOHNSON’S BRIEF LIFE OF CHURCHILL

Henry M. Rector

Johnson, Paul. Churchill. New York: Viking, 2009. 181pp.
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Paul Johnson’s most recent biography of Winston Churchill provides a thumbnail sketch of the British statesman’s life and achievements. At only 166 pages of
text, it cannot do justice to the epic scope of Churchill’s roles both as a peacetime
statesman and as a war leader, but it does offer judgments, some of them in implicit counterpoint to recent revisionist treatments of Churchill’s career.
Johnson writes that although Churchill, as Britain’s prime minister during
World War II, was nothing less than the savior of Britain, he was also the beneficiary of certain conditions that were not of his own making. By the outbreak of
war, for example, public opinion had turned against the military “brass hats,”
whose management of World War I had taken a catastrophic toll on British lives.
This meant that despite the resentment of some military leaders, Churchill had a
relatively free hand in strategic and military matters. He also benefited from national unity. After the pacifism of the 1930s was discredited, the British people
grasped that they were in a struggle for national survival and rallied around the
prime minister and a national government, including all parties.
Churchill was personally suited to wartime leadership in ways that none of
his contemporaries could equal, and his strategic communication skills and
work ethic were unrivaled. Also, Johnson credits Churchill with personal initiative in wartime policies that were crucial to the Allied victory. First, his innovation and expertise in airpower enabled him to organize a crash program
for British air superiority. Second, Johnson argues that Churchill was correct
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And, famously, Churchill artfully cultivated President Franklin D. Roosevelt
and American amity well before the attack on Pearl Harbor. No one except
Churchill, Johnson writes, could have made these indispensable contributions
to the Allied victory, which Churchill believed to be assured upon America’s
entry into the war.
Johnson argues that Britain’s allies share blame in two matters for which
Churchill has often been criticized. The first is the air campaign against Germany. He writes that Churchill pursued the bombing, including civilian targets,
enthusiastically and was supported in this wholeheartedly by the British public.
Although the bombing campaign did not significantly impair German industrial output until the outcome of the war was already clear, Johnson argues, it
was nonetheless justified. This was because after the July 1943 attack on Hamburg the air defenses for western Germany that became necessary were provided
at the cost of air superiority on the eastern front. Johnson goes on to describe the
February 1945 bombing of Dresden as “an atrocity” but argues that Churchill
carried this out mainly in fulfillment of a commitment made to Stalin at Yalta.
Johnson also maintains that the United States shares blame for the consequences of delays in launching the Normandy invasion. This delay, Churchill’s
critics argue, allowed the Red Army to advance far into Central Europe, ultimately bringing those territories behind the Iron Curtain. Churchill, recalling
the failed Dardanelles expedition in World War I, was reluctant to proceed with
the invasion until he had an overwhelming force at his disposal. After D-day, the
Allies could not make up the time that assembling this force had cost, and Churchill could not overcome Eisenhower’s insistence on a ponderous “broad front”
advance into Central Europe. This meant that the Red Army got to Berlin,
Prague, Vienna, and Budapest first.
Johnson has little to say about a subject that has been a focus of Churchill’s revisionist critics, namely, his role as architect of Britain’s special relationship with
the United States. He does note that Roosevelt was “oversuspicious of Churchill
and undersuspicious of Stalin” and offers the contrarian view that “the death of
FDR . . . came as a relief, especially as Harry S. Truman, brisk, decisive, much
better informed on strategy, proved infinitely easier to deal with.”
Of course, Churchill had already secured a place in the history of British strategy and warfare before his service as prime minister in World War II. Johnson
assesses Churchill’s role in two of the most controversial episodes of his
pre–World War II career.
The first of these was the disastrous Dardanelles expedition of 1915, which
Churchill masterminded as First Lord of the Admiralty. Johnson blames the fiasco on the operation’s irresolute implementation by military commanders.
However, in Johnson’s account, Prime Minister Herbert Asquith was the real
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villain of the piece. Asquith, already contemplating jettisoning Churchill as the
price of a new coalition government, refused to allow Churchill to assume command, as he had done during the siege of Antwerp in October 1914. Asquith was
only too eager to fire Churchill once the Dardanelles expedition turned into a
shambles.
Johnson’s take on this episode is incomplete, however. It is certainly true that
the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John “Jackie” Fisher, was at his most erratic during the planning for the operation and that the war minister—Field Marshal
Herbert Kitchener, Earl Kitchener—who had authority to commit ground
troops, vacillated in his support. Likewise, the in-theater commanders were inept. However, Churchill should have foreseen that his plan was too daring to be
attempted without more robust backing and implementation, and this arguably
justified his dismissal.
Johnson also faults Churchill for dismissing a potential Japanese threat during the interwar period. As chancellor of the exchequer, Churchill put the Royal
Navy on a tight budget. In an uncharacteristic lapse of imagination and insight,
Churchill made no objection when the government of David Lloyd George
allowed the Washington Naval Disarmament Treaty to supersede the AngloJapanese alliance, which the Japanese saw as disadvantageous. Johnson describes Churchill’s categorical rejection of any Japanese threat during these
years as a “complete mystery” and attributes British vulnerability in Asia between 1940 and 1942 directly to it. This lack of foresight ultimately led to the
sinking of two capital ships and the fall of Singapore.
Johnson reserves his greatest scorn for blunders that Churchill committed in
British domestic politics, particularly in the 1930s. Chief among these was his
impassioned, quixotic defense of Edward VIII during the abdication crisis of
1936, which culminated in Churchill’s disastrous intervention in the House of
Commons. This impaired his credibility at a time when he was about to deliver
his unwelcome, if prescient, warnings about Hitler’s ambitions.
Since Johnson’s take on Churchill’s career is not particularly original, his offering differs from other biographies mainly in its brevity, and therein lies its deficiency. Nevertheless, Churchill is a readable study for those who are daunted by
the overwhelming scale of other works on this twentieth-century giant.
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